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Against Relativism: Cultural Diversity and the Search for Ethical Universals in Medicine.
By RUTH MACKLIN. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1999. Pp. xii + 290. $32.95.
When, if ever, is it acceptable for a westerner to disapprove of the practice of
“female circumcision,” when it is estimated that between 85 and 115 million
women have undergone the procedure, and when it is practiced in 26 African
countries for cultural, religious, and social reasons, with a prevalence rate of up to
99 percent? How important is it to seek to refer to this practice in value-neutral
terms, rather than using the emotive term “female genital mutilation”? Who has
the right, beyond those persons belonging to the culture in question, to judge or
criticize such practices?
As one of the preeminent moral philosophers and bioethicists of the Western
world, Ruth Macklin is well qualified to explain the role of ethical discourse in iden-
tifying points of disagreement over the morality and defensibility of human conduct
and seeking resolution to conflict where possible. But as she points out in this her
latest work, in the context of cross-cultural judgments an additional step is required:
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namely, the task of showing that ethical concepts and perspectives from outside of
one’s own culture or value-system are acceptable and applicable to the culture
under scrutiny. In this book Macklin rejects the challenge that those not of a culture
are unqualified and unwelcome in commenting on that culture, and she seeks
rather to defend a position of judging certain cultural practices by bringing ethical
principles to bear upon them—which principles, she contends, are universal in
application across the cultures and communities of the world. While Macklin does
not deny the existence of cultural relativism or diversity as a phenomenon, she does
question whether its existence leads inexorably to the conclusion that there is no
role for the view that a universality of ethical values exists against which particular
cultural practices might be measured and found wanting. She admirably defends
her position that such a role can not only be made out, but that it should be exer-
cised in the interests of encouraging moral progress in the cultures of the world.
Macklin’s work is set in the context of a broader defense of the notion of univer-
sal human rights, and more particularly in the context of human health as a human
right. Chapters 1 to 3 give an account of the various arguments and views currently
surrounding ethical relativism, while Chapters 4 to 8 offer specific examples of prac-
tices in the health care setting which might be defended on the grounds of cultural
relativism. A full gamut of topics is covered, including the dynamics of the physi-
cian/patient relationship, the meaning and role of autonomy in health care deci-
sion-making, truth-telling in the context of terminal disease, confidentiality and pri-
vacy concerns, cultural variations in the definition of death and the consequences of
these definitions for transplantation programs, the rhetoric of reproductive rights,
and the ethics of international research and experimentation. Chapter 9 discusses
health and human rights as an intellectual construct and an emerging legal and
bioethical discipline, while Chapter 10 represents the culmination of this work’s cen-
tral theme, which is a response to the concerns of those who “recogniz[e] cultural
diversity and the value of tolerance, [but who] genuinely wonder how we can talk of
human rights and at the same time accept the thesis of ethical relativism” (p. 269).
In mounting her thesis, Macklin offers a plethora of examples from cultures
across the globe. She draws on a wealth of personal experience of studying these
cultures at first hand, although she admits to methodological inadequacies in her
studies and freely doubts the statistical significance of many of her results. But
Macklin is a philosopher and not a social scientist. Her aim is not to provide
anthropological survey evidence of diverse cultural practices, but rather to make
her philosophical position less open to attack as too conceptual, acontextual,
obscurantist, and insufficiently grounded in reality. In this she succeeds in large
measure, although at times her accounts of the cultural practices can verge on the
anecdotal, relating only tangentially to her central philosophical thesis.
That thesis holds that without general ethical principles there is no systematic
way to justify ethical judgments of cultural practices. Not only does Macklin defend
this as a legitimate exercise, but she maintains that “without principles we cannot
have moral progress” (p. 24). For her, “moral progress” is measured by “the
changes in laws in the direction of greater humaneness and respect for humanity
in every person” (p. 252). In essence, Macklin’s work represents as much a defense
of traditional principlism as it does an attack on relativism. As a basis for her thesis
she draws on anthropological notions of “universals”: that is, values that transcend
and pervade all human cultures, even when the manifestation of those values in
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particular cultures might vary between cultures and might indicate—at least to the
unreflective observer—that irreconcilable value-systems are at work. An example is
the principle of respect for persons, evidence of which Macklin finds in most of her
cultural examples. Indeed, she balks at the polarization of representations that
beleaguers the current cultural relativism debate wherein autonomy-driven rea-
soning typifies “Western” ethics and the primacy of communitarianism is seen as
the kernel of “Eastern” ethics. Macklin refuses, however, to engage with the post-
modern naysayers who would deny the existence of these universals. This she sees
as a futile exercise. Instead, she assumes the value of these universals and proceeds
to show how they can be found in a wide range of cultural practices, and how their
presence offers a basis for the adverse judgment of those practices as lacking in
moral progress. Thus, the reader will not find a defense of the fundamental prem-
ises upon which Macklin’s work is based. This is to be regretted, for her thesis is a
fascinating one, yet it is one that she has unfortunately left open to challenge, not
just from the postmodernists or the legions of the politically correct, but also from
those who would question the source of her universals and their content. Even if
one finds oneself in agreement with Macklin’s overarching hypothesis, one is left
to wonder nonetheless about its practical content and philosophical foundations.
Bioethics today is a global activity, and this cross-cultural critique of the role of
that discipline across the globe and in the cultures of the world is a welcome addi-
tion to the debate on cultural relativism. It deserves a wide readership and will be
of interest to physicians, ethicists, anthropologists, public heath workers, and
lawyers alike. Institutionally, this book is of considerable relevance to the work of
the National Institutes of Health, the National Bioethics Advisory Commission, and
the Department of Health and Human Services, none of which can afford to seek
comfort in the seemingly secure realm of “American bioethics.” If Macklin has one
message for us, it is this: bioethics is a concern for humanity in toto. We are all
jointly engaged in an enterprise towards moral progress for individuals and com-
munities alike. A brief look at ourselves and others reveals that we all “stand in
need of improvement” (p. 266).
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